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1.

INTRODUCTION

I am honored and delighted to be invited to give this lecture in the
distinguished series of the C. Edwin Baker Lecture for Liberty, Equality, and
Democracy. I am grateful to Professor Anne Lofaso and Dean Gregory Bowman
for giving me the opportunity to visit West Virginia for the first time and for their
generous introduction. What a pleasure it is, in particular, to address so many
first year law students at the commencement of their studies ofjurisprudence.
It was mentioned in the introductory remarks that the first holder of my
current appointment, the Vinerian Chair at Oxford, was William Blackstone. He
published his lectures in a collection of four volumes known as The
Commentaries.' In the middle of the eighteenth century, this best-seller became
the definitive statement of the common law. Those books disseminated
knowledge of the common law throughout the British territories and colonies.
Their summary of the common law provided a definitive exposition of the laws
that the United States and the United Kingdom still share to this day.
As well as engaging readers with many a fine turn of phrase,
Blackstone's Commentaries were attractive to lawyers on both sides of the
Atlantic, I believe, because they presented the common law as an integrated and
coherent whole. Instead of perceiving the law as a collection of bits and pieces
contained in judicial precedents and fragmentary legislation, Blackstone
articulated a vision of the common law as a coherent body of law that was based
on a systematic arrangement of rights and principles. The common law, as he
presented it, contained protection for the liberties of citizens, controlled
Vinerian Professor of English Law, All Souls College, University of Oxford.

1-4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2018

1

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 121, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 4
[Vol. 121

WEST VIRGINIA LAW RE VIEW

governmental power by means of the rule of law and constitutional restraints,
whilst at the same time supporting trade and agriculture by protecting property
rights and transactions. In Blackstone's eyes, the common law both reinforced
high moral standards and, at the same time, respected the liberty of everyone
against the tyranny of despots.
Since the eighteenth century and Blackstone's comprehensive account,
we have tended to disaggregate our knowledge and accounts of the common law.
We study it in parts such as constitutional law, property law, contract law, and
tort law. Perhaps the greatest divide in this understanding of the architecture of
the legal system lies between public law and private law. These fields of law are
often studied during separate years at law school. Public law, which includes
constitutional law, administrative law, and criminal law, primarily concerns the
relations between citizens and the state. Its most important rules are those fixed
in an applicable constitution, including its Bill of Rights. Private law, which
includes property law, family law, contract law, and tort law, is essentially
concerned with social and economic relations between private individuals, and
by extension, corporations. Private law is governed by an underlying principle
of equal respect for the rights of others, violation of which requires corrective
compensation to be rendered to the victim.
One of the consequences of the widespread acceptance of this divide
between public law and private law in our understanding of the legal system is
that, unlike Blackstone, we do not typically recognize that constitutional law may
provide rules and principles that should also determine the content of private law.
In particular, we have for a long time ignored Blackstone's perspective that the
fundamental rights or liberties of individuals apply both in constitutional law and
in private law. That sharp divide between public law and private law has,
however, been challenged in recent years in Europe. One label given to this
'2
intellectual development has been the "Constitutionalization of Private Law.
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in jurisdictions around the world, though not always using the same terminology of the
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HESSELINK, THE NEW EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 177 (Kluwer Law International ed., 2002); THE
IMPACT OF THE UK HUMAN RIGHTS ACT ON PRIVATE LAW (David Hoffman ed., 2011); CHANTAL
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CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF PRIVATE LAW

Although Blackstone would probably have been untroubled by this development
in legal reasoning, in recent decades it 3has generated controversy and even
considerable hostility in legal scholarship.
My aim in this lecture is to explain the concept of the
constitutionalization of private law and to consider why it is controversial and
even feared. I will set out, in particular, five concerns frequently voiced against
the movement in legal reasoning towards the constitutionalization of private law.
I will then explain why I think that the concerns of the critics tend to be
exaggerated and the challenges to existing private law relatively minor. As well
as viewing this fear of the constitutionalization of private law as largely
misplaced, I shall argue that this movement for the constitutionalization of
private law is potentially beneficial in the sense that it provides a mechanism by
which the common law can be adjusted to modem values, including the values
of liberty, equality, and democracy. Moreover, I shall argue that the
constitutionalization of private law forms part of a broader intellectual movement
to reconceive the foundations of the legal system not in terms of a closed system
of rules but rather as a coherent body of individual rights.
II.

THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF PRIVATE LAW

What is meant by the phrase "the constitutionalization of private law?"
The core idea is that the laws of contract, tort, or property have to be designed or
developed by the judges in a way that aligns all fields of private law with
constitutional rights. The meaning of the requirement of alignment is slightly
vague, but its thrust is clear. It signifies that although private law does not have
to duplicate constitutional rights exactly, it should not contradict or subvert
constitutional rights. In practice, the requirement of alignment means that courts
should interpret and develop private law rules and doctrines in a way that ensures
that their content conforms to, and is consistent with, the rights that are protected
in the relevant constitution. The relevant fundamental rights are those to be found
in the constitution or bill of rights or international human rights treaty that
governs the action of the particular court that must decide a private law dispute.
Since private law is state law in the United States, in most cases the
immediately relevant constitution should be the state constitution containing a
bill of rights. The federal constitution may also be relevant, however, since some
articles of the constitution such as the Fourteenth Amendment regulate the
powers of the states and their courts in some respects.4 In the United Kingdom,
the Human Rights Act 19985 requires courts to ensure that their judgments

3
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U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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conform to the requirements of the European Convention on Human Rights,6
which contains a list of rights not dissimilar from those in the U.S. Constitution.7
That European Convention on Human Rights has been ratified by more than 40
countries, including Russia, Turkey, and eastern European countries.' In the
European Union, the 28 Member States and the institutions of the European
Union itself must ensure that their actions and decisions, including any judicial
interpretations of European Law, conform to requirements of the Treaty between
the Member States
known as the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the
9
European Union.
Guided by the relevant source of fundamental rights, a court presented
with a dispute concerning the rights under private law of the litigants may be
asked to take various kinds of measures to ensure that its decision conforms to
or at least does not subvert respect for the relevant rights. A court might decline
to enforce an otherwise legally binding document on the ground that to do so
might unjustifiably interfere with an individual's enjoyment of fundamental
rights. Or a court might develop a new cause of action, developing the common
law in a new direction in order to ensure that private law provides adequate
protection of a fundamental right. The kinds of tasks to be performed during the
process of alignment can be illustrated by two famous decisions of the U.S.
Supreme Court. These decisions are notorious, I suggest, mostly because they
break down the divide between public and private law and engineer an alignment
between constitutional rights and private law.
In Shelley v. Kraemer,10 an African-American family named Shelly
purchased a home in St. Louis, Missouri, in 1945.11 They were unaware of a
restrictive covenant that prevented "people of the Negro or Mongolian Race"
from occupying the property. 12 A restrictive covenant is a special type of
contractual agreement between neighbors that binds any owner of the property
to which the covenant is attached, even after the original parties to the agreement
no longer own the property.1 3 Kraemer, who lived ten blocks away, but who was
a beneficiary of the restrictive covenant, successfully sued in the Missouri courts

6

Council of Europe, European Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 11, 1950, E.T.S. 5, 213

U.N.T.S 221.
7
Human Rights Act 1998, c. 42, § 1 (UK).
8
Impact in 47 countries, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, https://www.coe.int/en/web/human-rightsconvention/impact-in-47-countries (last visited Sept. 23, 2018).
9
Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C326)
391.
10
334 U.S. 1 (1948).
1
12

Id. at 5-6.
Id. at5.

13

Id. at 4-5.
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to prevent the Shelleys from obtaining possession of the property.' 4 The local
courts agreed that the purchase by the Shelley family was in breach of the
covenant and that therefore under the law of property of Missouri they should be
evicted. 15 The U.S. Supreme Court held that the racially-based restrictive
covenant, as a private agreement, was not in itself invalid under the constitution,
but that judges should not enforce the covenant because that would be "state
action." 16 Such state action would be discriminatory in the protection afforded to
property rights in violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.17 The Supreme Court insisted that it was
not requiring private individuals to conform to fundamental rights.' 8 "[T]he
action inhibited by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only such
action as may fairly be said to be that of the States. That Amendment erects no
shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful."' 9
Yet the order of a court, even in a private law matter, could be characterized as
state action.2 ° If so, any attempt to enforce a private agreement that subverted the
constitutional principle of equal protection would be blocked. 2 ' The decision
preserved, in theory, a sharp separation between public law and private law.
Simply looking at the result, however, the Supreme Court required an alignment
between the private law of restrictive covenants and the principle of equal
protection. The decision appears to constitutionalize private law, thereby
provoking continuing debate.
Similar observations may be made about another famous decision of the
U.S. Supreme Court: New York Times v. Sullivan.23 The case concerned a
successful claim for libel under Alabama law.24 The Montgomery Public Safety
Commissioner, L.B. Sullivan, complained that The New York Times had
published inaccurate statements regarding police action, for which he was
responsible, in connection with the civil rights movement.25 In particular, the

14
15
16

Id. at 6.
Id.
Id. at 13.

17

Id.

18

Id.

19

Id.

20

Id. at 19 20.

21

Id. at 20.

See, e.g., Mark D. Rosen, Was Shelley v. Kraemer Incorrectly Decided? Some New
Answers, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 451 (2007); Donald M. Cahen, The Impact of Shelley v. Kraemer on
the State Action Concept, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 718 (1956).
22

23

376 U.S. 254 (1964).

24

Id. at 256.

25

Id.
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publication claimed that Martin Luther King, Jr. had been arrested seven times;
whereas on the date of publication, the civil rights leader had only been arrested
four times (though by the time of litigation the higher number was true).26 The
newspaper was ordered to pay half a million dollars to Sullivan for this libel.27
Litigation to reverse the decision reached the Supreme Court.2 8 Although the
award of damages for libel was a matter of private law, the Court ruled that an
award of damages by a state court is "state action," and "[i]t matters not that that
law has been applied in a civil action and that it is common law only, though
supplemented by statute. ,,29 Once th
there was a finding of state action, the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution was applicable. 30 The Court declared that
the First Amendment protects the publication of all statements, even false ones,
about the conduct of public officials, except when statements are made with
actual malice (with knowledge that they are false or in reckless disregard of their
truth or falsity.) 31 As a consequence, unless the story in the newspaper was
deliberately false, the claim in defamation had to fail.32 Again we see the
alignment of private law with constitutional rights, though in this case, rather
than the Supreme Court merely blocking any action to enforce private rights that
undermine constitutional principles, the substantive content of the law of libel
was changed in order to align it with the First Amendment.
As well as those two famous decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, I hope
you will permit me to mention an English case as a further introduction to the
technique of alignment between private law and fundamental rights. The case,
McDonaldv. McDonald,33 provides a salutary reminder that in private law both
parties to the litigation can rely on fundamental rights.34 It is a sad story about a
young woman who was severely disabled, both mentally and physically.35 Her
parents decided that they should buy her a suitable home where she could live
independently.3 6 They borrowed money from a bank to purchase the property.37
To secure repayment of the loan, the bank took a charge or mortgage over the

26
27

Id. at 257-58.
Id.at 256.

31

See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 280.

32

Id.at 287-88.

28

29
30

33

[2016] UKSC 28, [2017] AC 273 (appeal taken from Eng.).

34
35

See id.
Id. at 2.

36

Id. at 3.

37

Id.
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property.3 8 Her parents then gave their daughter a lease to live in the house. She
contributed to the cost of the mortgage repayments by handing over some of the
welfare payments she received on account of her disability. 39 Unfortunately, the
parents became unemployed because of the financial crisis of 2008, and they fell
behind on the repayments of the loan.4 ° On their default on the loan, the bank
became entitled to take possession of the property and, as the new landlord, to
evict the disabled daughter by giving due notice under the terms of the lease and
in accordance with statutory protections for tenants. 4'
There was no doubt about the legal position under the common law and
statute: the law permitted the bank to deprive the young woman of her home,
even though she had been paying the agreed rent to her parents. She argued,
however, that such a result was incompatible with her right to a home under
Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights, which reads:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family
life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the
law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security, public safety or the economic well-being of
the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights
and freedoms of others.42
The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom agreed that her eviction by
the bank interfered with her right to a home and that the law of landlord and
tenant should be aligned with that requirement in Article 8. 43 But the Court went
on to point out that the bank had certain fundamental rights as well, in particular,
the right to respect for their possessions and property. 44 Article 8(2) expressly
reminds the court that an interference with the right to a home may be justified
by reference to the need to protect the rights of others.4 5 The Supreme Court of
the United Kingdom held that, provided the bank followed the procedures set out
in legislation for the eviction and conformed to any requirement in the lease, a
38

Id.

39

Id.

40

42

Id. at 4.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 32.

43

Id. at 40.

41

44

Id. at 39 (citing Council of Europe, European Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 11,
1950, E.T.S. 5, 213 U.N.T.S 221.).
45

Id.
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proper balance would be struck between the right to a home and the right to
property.46 The interference with the right to a home would be justified under a
test of proportionality.4 7 In this case, therefore, alignment required no change in
the law because
the statute already struck the correct balance between the rights
48
of the parties.
These decisions illustrate several aspects of the constitutionalization of
private law by the process of alignment. The first matter to note is that
constitutionalization does not permit individuals to rely on constitutional rights
to bring a claim against another private individual. The role of constitutional
rights is better described as one of indirect effect on the content of private law.
In other words, the constitutional rights modify existing private law rules rather
than create new causes of action. Nevertheless, this insertion of constitutional
rights into legal reasoning with respect to private law does call into question the
sharp distinction between public and private law. If the decisions of courts with
respect to disputes about private law matters are always regarded as state action,
then every issue in private law is potentially open to further constitutional
scrutiny. As a consequence of the constitutionalization of private law, courts
should, as a matter of legal method, ensure that all their decisions in both public
and private law conform to fundamental rights. If that is correct, it is evident that
legal reasoning must become more complex. Lawyers and judges should always
consider whether, in addition to the sources of private law in the common law
and statute, fundamental rights in the constitution or binding international
conventions require an adjustment of the settled private law rules. Usually, as the
McDonald v. McDonald case illustrates, courts will conclude that the rules of
private law already conform to the standards of the relevant fundamental rights.
That conclusion is especially likely where the democratic legislature has
considered the matter and has adjusted the common law to meet modem
standards and policies. The point is, rather, that the courts should always ask
whether private law needs some degree of adjustment in order to bring it into line
with fundamental rights.
III.

THE FEAR OF CONSTITUTIONALIZATION

Why are legal scholars concerned about this development in legal
reasoning that has been labeled the constitutionalization of private law? We can
identify five overlapping and, to some extent, contradictory concerns.

46

Id.

47

Id.

48

Id.
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First and foremost, many private lawyers are worried that the application
of fundamental rights to private law may prove extremely disruptive. 49 They
surmise that the content of private law will be changed by the application of
fundamental rights. That change will generate considerable uncertainty, leading
to more litigation. Even the most settled rules of law could potentially be
challenged by demands for alignment between fundamental rights and private
law. As a consequence of the decision in New York Times v. Sullivan, for
instance, the law of libel in all states was significantly modified by the protection
afforded to inaccurate, though not malicious, criticisms of public officials.5 °
Critics of constitutionalization are concerned that the demands for alignment
with fundamental rights will lead to radical changes in the common law, not
merely minor adjustments and developments. 5' In particular, they are alarmed
of action, thereby rendering
about the possibility of the creation of new causes
52
conduct wrongful that was previously lawful.
A second objection to constitutionalization of private law asserts that
private law already contains the necessary subtle compromises of the interests
and rights of individual citizens.53 The rules of contract law, tort law, and
property law can be seen as settled and detailed arrangements for protecting the
fundamental interests of individuals equally. On this view, the requirements of
constitutionalization have already been satisfied in the complexity of private law
doctrine. Appeals to fundamental rights in private law cases would merely
reopen the questions afresh by reformulating them in the abstract and uncertain
language of fundamental rights.54 Eventually, however, the process of
constitutionalization would very likely reformulate private law to reach much the
same positions as it currently maintains. That is what happened in McDonald v.
McDonald: having considered at length the application of the European
Convention on Human Rights, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom
decided that the existing law was entirely compliant with those rights.5 5 Notice
how this second objection insists that constitutionalization would be an
49
Donal Nolan, Negligence and Human Rights Law: The Casefor SeparateDevelopment, 76
MOD. L. REV. 286, 302 (2013).
50
See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
51

Jan

M.

Smits,

Private Law

and Fundamental Rights:

CONSTITUTIONALISATION OF PRIVATE LAW 8, 9

52

A

Sceptical View,

in

(Tom Barkhuysen & S. Lindenbergh eds., 2006).

E.g., Jonathan Morgan, Privacy, Confidence and Horizontal Effect: "Hello " Trouble, 62

CAMBRIDGE L.J. 444, 444 (2003).
53
Roderick Bagshaw, Tort Design and Human Rights Thinking, in THE IMPACT OF THE UK
HUMAN RIGHTS ACT ON PRIVATE LAW 110 (David Hoffman ed., Cambridge University Press
2011).
54
Olha 0. Cherednychenko, SubordinatingContractLaw to Fundamental Rights: Towards a
Major Breakthrough or Towards Walking in Circles?,in CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES AND EUROPEAN
CONTRACT LAW 35 (Stefan Grundmann ed., 2008).
55
See McDonald v. McDonald, [2016] UKSC 28, [2017] AC 273 (appeal taken from Eng.).
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unnecessary distraction leading to no changes of substance at all in most
instances, whereas the first objection worried that alignment might lead to radical
innovations in the common law.
A third criticism is that, even if it turns out that some changes in private
law are provoked by the constitutionalization of private law, any such changes
will almost certainly make the law worse.56 Private law has developed through
centuries of litigation and judicial examination of different arguments. The
courts have carefully weighed competing principles and the pull of different
policy objectives in order to construct private law doctrines. The focus on
constitutional rights, though important, is only one factor to be taken into
account. The danger is that private law will be adjusted by reference to a sole
consideration, namely fundamental rights, leading to the devaluation and
marginalization of other considerations such as welfare goals and efficiency. The
inherited wisdom of the common law might therefore be lost and its doctrines
impaired.
A fourth point against constitutionalization raises the question whether
it is appropriate to require private individuals to conform to the standards set for
governments in constitutions.57 While it is right, for instance, that governments
should treat their citizens with equal concern and respect, it is unclear that such
a constitutional legal imperative should be invariably applied to ordinary
individuals in their personal dealings with others.5 8 Such a requirement of
conformity to constitutional standards would involve a considerable interference
with individual freedom. Individuals would not be permitted, for instance, to
choose their friends solely by reference to their preferences and prejudices, for
that latitude might lead to selections that involved discrimination against
particular racial groups or members of particular religions. In some special cases,
such as recruitment for employment, it may be necessary to interfere with the
liberty of employers to be guided by adverse stereotypes of candidates in order
to ensure that there is fair opportunity forjobs in the labor market. In such cases,
even though they are in most cases private individuals or corporations, employers
are co-opted by the state to perform an aspect of its functions, because in practice
they are in the best position to secure equal opportunities in the labor market. But
that imposition of duties on private individuals and bodies to uphold human
rights is the exception. Normally, it is argued under this fourth objection, the law
should respect the autonomy and liberty of individuals. They should not be

56

Nolan, supra note 49; Bagshaw, supra note 53.

57
Hugh Collins, On the (In)compatibility of Human Rights Discourse and Private Law, in
CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW: XXII/2, at 26, 51 (Hans Micklitz ed., 2014).
58
John Gardner, Private Activities and Personal Autonomy: At the Margin of Anti-

discriminationLaw, in DISCRIMINATION: THE LIMITS OF THE LAW (Bob Hepple & Erika Szyszczak
eds., 1992); Hugh Collins, Discrimination in the Private Sphere, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK
OF THE ETHICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2018).
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required to behave in ways that always conform to constitutional standards. If
that proposition is correct, it raises an objection to the constitutionalization of
private law, since there is a risk that the alignment of private law will tend to
require private parties to be the duty bearers of fundamental rights. In effect that
is what happened in Shelley v. Kraemer: Mr. Kraemer was required to behave in
a non-discriminatory manner even though he (or his predecessors in title) had
bought the right to exclude African-Americans from their neighborhood in a
valid contract.59
A final objection to the constitutionalization of private law raises more
profound questions about the architecture of the legal system. While Blackstone
rejected a sharp boundary between public law and private law, at least with
regard to the application of liberties or fundamental rights, since his time, the
vast bureaucratic apparatus of the modem state has developed. The size and reach
of the modem state has required the development of modem public law doctrines,
including administrative law. Special obligations contained in public law have
been imposed on this powerful state machine in order to protect the rights of
individuals and to uphold the rule of law. On this view, public law serves.
different functions from private law. It controls and steers as best we can the rise
of the massive power of the state and government. To transplant the legal
obligations imposed on the modem state into the field of private law and the legal
relations between private citizens would be to overlook these profound
differences in the functions of private law and public law. The division between
public law and private law is important on this view and should be preserved.
That architecture for the legal system should discourage the transplant of
fundamental rights into private law. The origin of bills of fundamental rights and
liberties lies in the establishment of a constitutional framework to control the
exercise of state power.6 ° These public law ideas are unnecessary and
inappropriate for the realm of private law. Their attempted application would
undermine the sharp separation of public and private law, which would lead to
about the different purposes of public and private law in a legal
confusion
61
system.
Having set out these five serious objections to the constitutionalization
of private law, I will now seek to rebut them. My general argument will be that
the process of alignment of private law with fundamental rights is in general a
benign and welcome development. My estimation is that disruption to private
law is likely to be rare and only at the margins. Yet the changes brought about
by the process of alignment are likely to be beneficial to private law. When

59
60

Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
For example, England: Magna Carta Libertatum (1215) and Bill of Rights (1689); France:

The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789); Virginia: Declaration of Rights
(1776); and United States of America: United States Constitution (1789) and Bill of Rights (1789).
Nolan, supra note 49.
61
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fundamental rights are used to modify or develop the doctrines of private law,
they will almost certainly enable private law to evolve in ways that make it more
consistent with the values of the twenty-first century, including the importance
that we attach to liberty and equality. The insertion of the guideposts of
fundamental rights into the reasoning of private law may also enable it to resist
the totalizing tendencies of considerations of economic efficiency.

IV.

THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LAW

I will tackle the fifth and the most fundamental listed objection to the
constitutionalization of private law first. It is undoubtedly correct that public law
and private law perform different functions in general. Transplants from one
category to the other certainly require caution and circumspection. But there are
also some reasons to think that fundamental rights should be regarded as a special
case where the division between public law and private law should not be taken
as an absolute barrier to cross-fertilization.
As I have mentioned already, contemporary views of the division of
public and private law regard these two branches of the law as performing
different functions. Public law controls the actions of government, including its
relations between the institutions of the state and its citizens. Private law provides
rules to govern the social and economic interactions of private actors. But both
public and private law are part of an integrated legal system, not entirely
independent rule systems. One might draw an analogy with the close relationship
between neighbors who share a common dividing wall between their properties,
as in the case of semi-detached houses and some condominiums. Like
neighboring families, public and private law function independently.
Nevertheless, there are some potential interactions, rather like having noisy
neighbors or jointly tackling the need to make repairs to the roof that shelters
both properties. Very occasionally, in order to ensure harmonious living
together, it may be necessary for the neighbors to enter into dialogue with each
other. In other words, the private lawyers may have to take note of some vital
interests of the public lawyers that otherwise might be thwarted by private
lawyers ignoring their neighbors' complaints. But these would be rare cases
where major public law issues were at stake, as in the example of New York
Times v. Sullivan, where freedom of the press was at risk of being suppressed by
62
extravagant awards of damages for minor errors in criticisms of public officials.
On the whole, however, private lawyers prefer to be left undisturbed by their
neighbors and to erect good soundproofing that prevents them from hearing
claims for fundamental rights.
Although that conventional view of the division between public and
private law still provides the dominant view of the architecture of the legal
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system today, the movement for the constitutionalization of private law often
takes a different view of the architecture of the legal systems. This view says that
the whole legal system is derived from human rights or fundamental rights.63 A
legal system is founded on the notion that individuals have rights. With that
starting point, all the different parts of the legal system evolved. The presence of
fundamental rights is like the magma at the core of the earth. From the molten
core erupts everything in the planet. In the legal system, everything is derived
from this idea that individuals have rights and out of that idea flows various parts
of the law. Some of these parts we call property law, some of which we call
contract law, and some we call constitutional law, but it is all fundamentally
based upon and constructed out of the raw material of individual rights. Using a
different metaphor, in Germany the constitutional rights in the Basic Law (or
federal constitution) are said to64 have a radiating effect on all aspects of the legal
system, including private law.
One way of expressing these ideas more formally is to say that the bill
of rights contained in a country's constitution is not only the highest or supreme
law but also the source or origin of all the laws in the legal system. On this view
of the architecture of a legal system, since fundamental rights are the source of
both public and private law, there is no reason to be concerned about the process
of alignment. Indeed, constitutionalization of private law is not properly
described as alignment because the requirement is not to duplicate or imitate
public law but rather to be true to the origins of private law in the magma of
individual rights.
Although the magma theory, as I shall call it, is attractive in the way that
it presents private law as being concerned with and derived from individual
rights, in the final analysis the claim that all parts of the legal system are derived
from the same source of fundamental rights also has to recognize that there is
considerable functional differentiation between public law and private law
within the legal system. In particular, although the legal system may share a
common source in respect for fundamental individual rights, there are three
differences between public and private law that always will influence the
operation of fundamental rights in the context of private law.
First, there are some fundamental rights that play an important role in
public law but tend to play only a marginal role in private law disputes. These
are rights that are primarily designed to prevent the abuse of state power, such as
powers of seizure and arrest. 65 Another example is the right to a fair trial, which
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protects citizens against the abuse of the coercive powers of the state.66 It is true,

of course, that citizens have to be able to go to court in private law matters and
obtain an effective remedy, as in the case of enforcing contractual or property
rights. In some cases the right to a fair trial may assist a private litigant, such as
a consumer, to obtain a fairer legal process or a more effective remedy. 67 But in
such an example, the right to a fair trial provides a background condition for the
effective functioning of a private law system rather than a source for determining
the content of the substantive private law rights.
Secondly, fundamental rights may have different meanings according to
whether the issue concerns a relationship of a public law kind, such as that
between a citizen and the police, or an interaction regulated by private law
between private individuals. The ambit and the strength of the right may differ
between public and private law. For instance, the state may be not be entitled to
control various kinds of speech, even if it is extremely offensive to the most
powerful of political leaders, because speech in the public law realm is given
strong protection and a broad meaning.68 In contrast, the freedom of speech of
employees of a company may be strictly curtailed by the terms of the contract of
employment that prevent them from bringing the employer or its products and
services into disrepute, and fundamental rights will usually not challenge that
restriction on freedom of speech.
The third point that the magma theory must take into account is that
invariably in private law cases both sides of the dispute have rights. Whereas in
public law cases, the government does not have any fundamental rights because
the bill of rights serves the function of protecting the citizen against the
government. In private law, however, both parties have rights. For instance, in
Shelley v. Kraemer, the neighbor has the property right represented by the
restrictive covenant, and the purchaser of the property has the right to equal
treatment and not be discriminated against on the ground of race. 69 n private
law, the competing claims of fundamental rights will always have to be balanced
against each other. The issue in public law, instead, is whether any interference
with rights is justified by considerations of public policy.
None of these three points undermine the magma theory of the place of
fundamental rights in the architecture of a legal system. They merely point out
that once the magma has erupted, it is likely to form different geological features
according to the issues that have to be addressed. The legal system contains
considerable functional differentiation, including the divide between public and
private law.
66
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Bearing in mind those points, if a version of the magma theory is broadly
correct, it undermines the objection that to introduce fundamental rights into
private law would be to attempt to transplant an alien idea into private law that
will be disruptive of private law doctrine and mess up the clarity of the
architecture of the legal system. On the contrary, if the magma theory is correct,
paying attention to individual rights in private law cases will merely serve to help
private lawyers remember and reinforce the roots of the various doctrines that
provides the rules of private law.
V.

THE DISRUPTION OF INDIRECT EFFECT

Let me now turn to address the first and second objections to the
constitutionalization of private law. In some ways they may be regarded as
cancelling each other out. The first objection worries that the process of
alignment will lead to a great disturbance in the force of private law, leading to

major changes and unpredictability. The second objection insists, on the
contrary, that although the process of constitutionalization of private law will:
likely cause some confusion, when the dust has settled, we will have much the
same rules of private law as before. The difference between these points of view
depends partly on their differing underlying views about the place of
fundamental rights in the architecture of the legal system. Under the first
objection, there is a strict separation between public and private law, with
fundamental rights located almost exclusively in public law. The second
objection tends to embrace the magma view of fundamental rights-that they
infuse both public and private law. In addition to those differing orientations,
these two objections to the constitutionalization of private law disagree about the
likely impact of the process of alignment. This disagreement seems to derive
from differing views about the probable operation of what was described above
as the indirect effect of fundamental rights in private law.
The second point of view reminds us that constitutionalization does not
permit the use of fundamental rights to provide the basis for new causes of action.
What it requires, instead, is that existing rules of private law, and the claims they
support, should be interpreted in a way that ensures that they conform to
fundamental rights. In New York Times v. Sullivan,7" for instance, the newspaper
was not bringing a claim for damages for interference with the freedom of the
press; it was merely asking the private law courts to develop the law of libel in a
way that permitted lively political debate in the newspaper without fear of
liability for huge claims in damages for minor errors.7' In other words,
fundamental rights should only be indirectly effective in private law, whereas in

70

376 U.S. 254 (1964).

71

See id. at 264-65.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2018

15

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 121, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 4
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 121

public law it is often possible to bring a claim against the government in which
protection of the fundamental right is the basis for the cause of action.
The constraint that fundamental rights can only be indirectly effective,
provides, to some extent, an answer to the fourth objection to the
constitutionalization of private law. In a formal sense, the only duty bearer in
private law is the court. The duty is placed on the court to reach a decision that
conforms to the fundamental rights. Technically speaking, there was no duty
placed on Kraemer to respect the equal protection and property rights of the
Shelleys. Yet, it is probably more realistic and convincing to admit that the
consequence of the court's ruling was, in effect, to limit Kraemer's property
rights by reference to a duty to respect the Shelleys' equal rights. As we shall
shortly see, strong versions of the idea of indirect effect make it hard to
distinguish between the limitation of the duty to the court and the extension of
the duty to private actors.72
Given that fundamental rights will only be indirectly effective and not
provide the basis for new kinds of legal claims, it may also be argued that the
fears about disruption to private law caused by the process of alignment may
prove to be exaggerated. In my view, however, though the concerns about
disruption caused by the insertion of fundamental rights into private law are
sometimes overblown, it is right to be skeptical about the supposed limits on
change established by the limitation of the impact of fundamental rights to
indirect effect. Indeed, in my view it is often hard to spot any real difference in
practical effect between the indirect effect of fundamental rights on private law
and the forbidden use of fundamental rights to ground fresh claims. Let me
illustrate that contention with some cases involving indirect effect.
My first example involves the development of the tort of privacy in
English common law. A claim was brought by Naomi Campbell, a supermodel,
against the Mirror Group Newspapers (MGN). 73 They published in their tabloid
newspaper a photograph of her leaving a drugs rehabilitation center. 74 Although
she had publicly maintained that she did not have a drug addiction problem, this
picture proved that contention to be untrue. She could not complain that the
newspaper had defamed her because there was no denying the truth of the story.
Instead, Campbell claimed that the newspaper had invaded her privacy and in so
doing had committed a tort.75
The problem with this claim was that no such tort existed at the time.
Her claim, therefore, had to use an existing recognized tort known as breach of
For an exploration of the different strengths of indirect effect, see Alison L. Young,
Mapping Horizontal Effect, in THE IMPACT OF THE UK HUMAN RIGHTS ACT ON PRIVATE LAW 16
(David Hoffman ed., 2011).
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confidence, which concerns the misuse of information given in confidence. 76 In
order to permit her claim to succeed, the UK Judicial Committee of the House of
Lords, the predecessor body to the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, had
to change the nature of the tort of breach of confidence in order to extend it to
situations where the plaintiff had not given confidential information to the
defendant.77 The tort had to be expanded to apply where the defendant had
acquired and disclosed information about the claimant that the claimant would
rather remain private and confidential.78 In order to steer the law towards that
development, the court held the tort of breach of confidence should be aligned
with Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights, especially the
phrase the right to "respect for private life," though the tort should also respect
the rights of others, particularly the freedom of the press protected in Article
10. 7 9 . The content of the revised tort would be determined by striking a balance
between those two fundamental rights. The final result was that some of
Campbell's claims were successful; in particular, she prevailed against. the
publication of the picture in the newspaper because the image was regarded as a
disproportionate violation of her privacy. 80 Although the court denied creating a
new tort (rather it aligned an existing tort with fundamental rights), there is no
doubt that prior to this decision, the newspaper would not have committed any
legal wrong in publishing a picture of a celebrity in a public place. The case
illustrates how the distinction between developing an existing tort through the
process of indirect effect and creating a new tort based upon fundamental rights
may turn out to be illusory in practice. If so, the concern that the process of
alignment of private law with fundamental rights will lead to considerable
disruption of the law may prove correct.
The view that constitutionalization is likely to be disruptive is likely to
be strengthened by recent developments in the European Court of Human Rights
with regard to the interpretation and enforceability of contracts. Consider the
problem addressed by the Court in Pla and Puncernau v. Andorra,8 1 a case
arising in Andorra involving a disputed will. 82 An old lady owned land in

Andorra. 83 She left the property in her will to her grandchildren, and in the
absence of grandchildren, some remote cousins.8 4 Her will was interpreted by the
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Andorran court to exclude the person who appeared to be her grandson on the
grounds that he had been adopted rather than being born to the son of the
testator.85 The adopted child complained to the European Court of Human Rights
in Strasbourg that when interpreting the will, the Andorran courts had
discriminated against him by not treating him equally.8 6 The Court agreed that
since the will was not absolutely explicit about the exclusion of adopted children,
it must be interpreted in a way that is consistent with human rights, which in this
case would permit the adopted grandson to inherit the property.87 Assuming that
the Andorran court was correct about the testator's intention to restrict the
inheritance to her blood line, what the European Court of Justice did was to
rewrite the 88
will to conform to fundamental rights concerned with equal protection
of the law.

That approach to interpretation of legal documents in private law was
taken even further in Bdrbulescu v. Romania.89 In this case, an employer had
issued strict instructions and a code of conduct that employees should not use
social media on the firm's IT equipment during working time except on the
firm's business.9" The employer stressed that breach of this rule would be
sanctioned by dismissal. 91 Mr. Bdrbulescu used the firm's IT equipment to send
messages on Yahoo to his fianc6 during working hours. 92 The employer
discovered this breach of the rule not only by monitoring the destination of the
messages sent, but also by reading and printing out these personal messages.93
The employee's claim for unfair dismissal failed before the Romanian courts
because his breach of the employer's disciplinary code was undisputed.9 4 Before
the European Court of Human Rights, however, the issue was viewed through
the framework of Article 8 and its protection of the right to privacy with respect
to correspondence.9 5 The Court criticized the decision of the Romanian court on
two grounds. 96 First, it said that the employer had interfered with the employee's
right to privacy because it had not made it clear in advance that it would not only
monitor the destination of messages, but also read these personal messages and
Id. at
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make them public in court proceedings. The contract should be interpreted
restrictively to protect the employee's right to privacy as far as possible. Second,
going even further, the Court insisted that employers could not remove the right
to privacy of communications entirely in the workplace: "an employer's
instructions cannot reduce private social life in the workplace to zero. Respect
for private life and for the privacy of correspondence continues to exist, even if
these may be restricted in so far as necessary." 97 The implication of this second
ground for upholding Mr. Bdrbulescu's claim is that in whatever manner an
employer may draft its contract of employment, terms that seek to exclude the
ability of workers to have private communications with friends and family during
the working day are likely to be held to be unenforceable, unless the employer
on communications to be necessary for a
can demonstrate such restrictions
98
legitimate business purpose.
These two decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, with
regard to the interpretation of legal documents, try to stay within the framework
of only aligning private law with fundamental rights indirectly. The Court
presents its decisions as adopting the method of interpreting these legal
documents in such a way as their content conforms to the standards of the
Convention on human rights. The idea of indirect effect, in this context, is that
in the case of ambiguity in the meaning of a legal document, such as a will or a
contract, the interpretation that accords best with respect for human rights should
be favored. The problem in these two decisions is that the ambiguity in the
written document was rather manufactured by the Court. In Pla and Puncerno,
the Andorran court read the will as unambiguously excluding the adopted
grandson, no doubt at least in part because the legal process of adoption was
unknown to Andorran law, so that it seemed unlikely that the testator had
intended to include an adopted child in her will. 99 In Bdrbulescu, the employer's
rule book was comprehensive and didactic in his prohibition on personal
communications.10 0 It is true that the contract did not explicitly state that the
employer would read those personal communications, but the Romanian courts
reasonably supposed that employees would understand that the employer would
read such messages in order to confirm that its rules had been broken. To suggest,
as the European Court of Human Rights did, that employees might still have a
reasonable expectation that the employer would not actually read these personal
messages runs counter to the whole tenor of the employer's bombastic and
oppressive disciplinary code.
If it is correct to claim that the ambiguities in these legal documents were
to a considerable extent invented by the Court, it becomes apparent that the
97
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technique of indirect effect is, rather, more radical than its proponents may
suggest. In these cases, the European Court of Human Rights placed constraints
on freedom of contract and freedom to dispose of one's property through gifts
by trying to ensure that these expressions of agreement conform to the demands
of the Convention on Human Rights. The full strength of these interventions is
revealed in Bdrbulescu when the Court appears to say, in the passage quoted,
that it will not permit such strict controls over the right to privacy, unless the
employer can justify them as necessary in the pursuit of a legitimate business
aim. 10 Although the Court maintains its formal position that it is merely giving
indirect effect to fundamental rights in the context of private law disputes, the
result seems to be that employers cannot use their contracts to place unnecessary
constraints on their employee's Convention rights and freedoms. That
development appears to move beyond interpretation of contracts to the regulation
of employment relations.
My conclusion is, therefore, that the method of aligning private law with
fundamental rights by giving indirect effect to fundamental rights can function
in quite a disruptive way. It can challenge basic principles of private law, such
as freedom of contract, in order to secure the protection of other fundamental
rights. Furthermore, the prohibition on the creation of new causes of action in
private law is revealed in cases such as Campbell v. MGN Ltd as imposing an
illusory limitation. The difference between creating an entirely new claim in tort
and reformulating an old cause of action that has a broader scope of application
is surely a casuistic distinction. The first concern about constitutionalizationthat it creates risks of disruption to the certainty of private law rules caused by
alignment of private law with fundamental rights-seems to have considerable
substance to it. The question remains, however, whether this potential disruption
is undesirable.

VI.

THE BENEFICIAL EFFECTS OF CONSTITUTIONALIZATION

The issue is whether the undoubted disruptive effects of the
constitutionalization of private law are outweighed by the benefits alignment
brings to private law. Although creating uncertainty in private law is in general
undesirable, there are times when the law needs to evolve, modernize, and adapt
to modern conditions. For instance, legal rules that were once regarded as fair in
a hierarchical and patriarchal society may seem untenable and unwelcome in a
modern democracy. Can the alignment of private law with fundamental rights be
regarded as a welcome tool of modernization of this kind because it enables the
judges to question whether the existing rules adequately reflect the values and
practical requirements of the contemporary world? Or, should we regard the
insertion of fundamental rights into private law as an unnecessary and confusing
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intervention because private law is perfectly capable of evolving in tune with
society without outside help? Those who view the constitutionalization of private
law as, in general, a beneficial development usually points to two consequences
of the alignment of private law with fundamental rights.
In the first place, what emerges reasonably clearly from the few cases
that I have discussed is that the process of alignment of private law with
fundamental rights tends to nudge private law in a liberal direction. The
fundamental rights frame the issues in terms of protections for liberties or for
equal concern and respect under the law. In Shelley v. Kraemer, the law of
restrictive covenants was modified so that it cannot be used as a tool for racebased exclusions from occupying or owning property. 0 2 The decision in New
York Times v. Sullivan gave strong protection for freedom of the press, especially
when the press is critically evaluating the performance of public officials as part
of the democratic process. 103 The decision in Bdrbulescu v. Romania challenged
an employer's power to use the contract of employment to impose a regime of
such total control over employees' behavior that it prevents individuals from
having a fulfilling personal life. 104 Liberals are likely to welcome those decisions;
whereas others may prefer private law to adopt a more conservative orientation.
Secondly, it is sometimes argued that the constitutionalization of private
law is likely to help the "have-nots" against wealthy and powerful individuals.'
In some cases, the indirect effect of the protection of fundamental rights may
certainly help weaker parties in their market transactions. In a famous German
case, 0 6 for instance, a bank that had required a young woman to sign a guarantee
for her father's loan from the bank was prevented from enforcing the guarantee
because at the time the guarantee was signed, there was no possibility that she
would ever be able to meet the obligation to repay the debt, so the father's default
would plunge her into penury for the rest of her life. 10 7 Although the German
private law courts had enforced the guarantee against the hapless young woman,
the German Federal Constitutional Court regarded this transaction as one that
undermined the dignity and autonomy of the individual, so that it should not be

102

See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).

103

See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).

104

See Bdrbulescu v. Romania, 754 Eur. Ct. H. R. (2017).

105

See OLHA 0.

CHEREDNYCHENKO, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS,

CONTRACT LAW AND THE

PROTECTION OF THE WEAKER PARTY (2007).
106

BVerfG, 1 BvR 567/89, Oct. 19, 1993, BVerfGE 89, 214. For a brief summarization of this

case in English, see UNIVERSITY OF GRONINGEN, PARTY AUTONOMY AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT IN
(2010),
306-07
UNION
EUROPEAN
THE
https://www.rug.nl/research/portal/files/1 4867116/PartyAutonomy as a FundamentalRight-i

n the European UnionEuropeanReview of ContractLaw2010_303 318.pdf.
107
BVerfG, 1 BvR 567/89, Oct. 19, 1993, BVerfGE 89, 214.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2018

21

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 121, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 4
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 121

enforced.10 8 The case certainly illustrates a situation where a weaker party is
pressed by the stronger party, in this case both her father and the bank, into
making an extremely unfavorable transaction. There has been a similar pattern
with respect to the protection of the fundamental rights of workers against
interference by employers. In Europe, the European Court of Human Rights has
protected the freedom of workers to join trade unions and to take part in
associated activities such as collective bargaining. 10 9 It has also protected
domestic workers and others from treatment that amounts to human trafficking
and modern slavery.' 10 Such decisions appeal to those who believe that private
law ought to do more to assist and protect people who are typically the weaker
parties to transactions, such as consumers, employees, and tenants.
In my view, however, there is no inherent tilt in the legal protection of
fundamental rights that favors weaker parties. Stronger parties have fundamental
rights as well and they should be equally well protected by the courts. In
McDonald v. McDonald,we saw how the bank's interest in foreclosing on the
mortgage and evicting the tenant was protected as part of the fundamental right
to property."'1 The weaker party's right based on the protection of the right to a
home was a significant limitation on that property right, but ultimately it was
satisfied by the landlord following the procedure for giving notice set out in
legislation. Similarly, in employment cases, though workers' fundamental rights
have been protected, the European Court of Justice has protected an employer's
freedom to conduct a business, which can protect an employer against what the
court may regard as excessive protection for workers' rights." 2 Although there
may be no inherent tilt in the protection of fundamental rights in favor of weaker
parties, what may be true, of course, is that in practice stronger parties are more
likely to run roughshod over others' fundamental rights because they expect to
be able to get their own way. To that extent, the constitutionalization of private
law is likely to be of greater assistance to weaker parties in a practical way.
VII.

THE RULE OF LAW

In this analysis of the movement in legal reasoning in favor of the
constitutionalization of private law, we have considered a number of objections
to the alignment of private law with fundamental rights. It has been conceded
that some disruption may be caused to existing private law doctrines, but it has
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been suggested that these challenges are likely on the whole to serve worthwhile
purposes of modernizing private law. Furthermore, it has been accepted that in
most cases, the insertion of fundamental rights into private law is unlikely to
provoke any change because private law is itself derived at least in part from the
magma of individual rights. Despite these assurances, there will undoubtedly be
many private lawyers who will remain concerned about the potential disruption
caused to private law. A popular and well-founded view is that clear and stable
rules of private law are needed by business and commerce in order to flourish.
The ability of courts to revise the doctrines of private law by reference to abstract
concepts, such as privacy and freedom of speech, creates, on this view, an
undesirable degree of uncertainty that should be avoided. The great strength of
the common law, it is often said, is that it is stable, rule-bound, and highly
predictable, unlike European civil law systems, where overriding principles of
good faith and good morals function to create unpredictable exceptions to the
rules of contract, tort, and property. If the common law were to permit
fundamental rights to overturn settled doctrines, it may be feared that the
common law would lose its alleged competitive edge over other legal systems.
Although the concerns about the disruptive potential of alignment with
fundamental rights have some validity, I suggest in conclusion that these
concerns presuppose a view of the Rule of Law that is implicitly challenged by
the movement for the constitutionalization of private law. In the opening essay
of his book A Matterof Principle,Ronald Dworkin advanced the thesis that there
are two possible conceptions of the Rule of Law.' 3 He drew a distinction
between the rule-book version of the Rule of Law and a rights-based version of
the Rule of Law. 14 He drew this distinction for the purpose of arguing that judges
are not necessarily engaging in inappropriate political activity when they are
being activists and not following the rules of law strictly according to the literal
meaning, provided that they are upholding the rights of individuals. Whatever
the merits of that broader argument about the appropriate role of judges, for my
purpose what is crucial is to appreciate the dichotomy between a rule-based
conception of the Rule of Law and a ights-based version because it is the switch
from the former to the latter that is contained within the movement for the
constitutionalization of private law.
According to Dworkin, the rule-book conception of the Rule of Law
insists that, so far as is possible, the power of the state should
never be exercised against individual citizens except in
accordance with rules explicitly set out in a public rule book
available to all. The government as well as ordinary citizens
must play by these public rules until they are changed, in
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accordance with further rules about how they are to be changed,
which are also set out in the rule book.1 15
The rule-book conception of the Rule of Law is obviously indebted to the work
of H.L.A. Hart,1 16 and in its expression of the importance of freedom from
arbitrary power, it is closely affiliated to what has become known as the
republican conception of liberty. 17
In Dworkin's second conception of the Rule of Law, the rights
conception that he favors, citizens are regarded as having moral and political
rights, which must be respected by positive law. 1 8 Courts must, therefore,
uphold those rights so far as is practicable. "The rule of law on this conception
19
is the ideal of rule by an accurate public conception of individual rights."'
Dworkin clarifies that under this rights conception of the Rule of Law, judges
should, in general, follow the positive rules of law that have been laid down in
advance; otherwise, judges would be likely to be acting unfairly, unjustly, and in
a way that defeats existing rights. 120 The rights conception of the Rule of Law
requires judges to enforce the law according to its plain meaning because those
transparent rules usually express an accurate public conception of individual
rights. But there will be cases, known as hard cases, where it will be necessary
to depart from existing rules of law, even though those rules contain prima facie
evidence of what rights people have, in order to uphold the true rights of citizens
properly and accurately. 2 1 In his subsequent book, Law's Empire,122 Dworkin
explained how a hypothetical and super-human judge known as Hercules should
carry out this task of ensuring that he always reaches the right answer by
producing in his interpretation of the law an accurate conception of the rights of
23
citizens. 1

In my view, much of the force of the criticisms of the disruptive potential
of the constitutionalization of private law draw their strength from an implicit
reliance upon the rule-book conception of the Rule of Law. While the attachment
to upholding the formal rules of law has many merits, as Dworkin acknowledges,
slavish adherence to the rules is not necessarily going to lead to fair results and
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justice for the parties. The rights-based conception of the Rule of Law allows for
the possibility of modifying the settled rules of law in hard cases where it is
necessary to adjust the law in order to protect a coherent conception of the rights
of individuals under the constitution. In other words, the movement for the
constitutionalization of private law appears to presuppose something close to
Dworkin's rights-based conception of the Rule of Law. From that perspective,
far from some disruption to settled rules of private law being a problem, it is a
sign that the rights-based conception of the Rule of Law is flourishing.
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